what the next day would bring. Aft er two more days of battle, the Confederate army could not dislodge the Union army and in the end suff ered, quite possibly, its worst tactical defeat yet in the war.
Aft er the dramatic victory for the Confederates at the Battle of Chancellorsville in early May 1863, Robert E. Lee, commanding general of the anv, gained approval for another attempt at invading the North. On June 3 Lee stealthily withdrew his army from the Fredericksburg area and took them west and north along the Rappahannock River, over to the Shenandoah Valley, and north through Maryland into Pennsylvania. Slow to react initially, the Union aop followed hard on the Confederate heels. Th e Union army roughly paralleled the Confederate route of marching, ever mindful of keeping themselves between the Confederates and Washington, dc.
George G. Meade, newly appointed commanding general of the Union aop, did not know the exact location of Lee's army. With most of the army concentrated around Fredrick, Maryland, Meade decided to advance his seven infantry and one cavalry corps north along a wide twenty-fi ve mile front covering both Washington, dc, and Baltimore. Similarly, Lee had little knowledge of the Union army's location. He had not heard from his cavalry commander, J. E. B. Stuart, since June 24. Th e primary responsibility for gathering information on enemy locations rested with the cavalry arm. Stuart eff ectively screened the anv's movement up the Shenandoah and on into Maryland. He then took three of his best brigades on a daring attempt to circle eastward around the Union army. Whether for fame, Th ere is a debate as old as the war that is ongoing even today about whether the Confederates could have captured Cemetery Hill or Culp's Hill on the fi rst day of battle at Gettysburg. Th e argument implies that had the Confederates achieved this feat, they would have won the battle and possibly turned the tide of the war in their favor. Th is remains one of the giant what-ifs of the war, voiced by more than a few veterans and subsequent historians. One famous example comes from Isaac Trimble, an unattached Confederate general at the time who made the spurious claim that he could have pulled it off if given only one good regiment.
1 However, by late aft ernoon of that fi rst day, given the condition of the forces immediately available, the lack of intelligence they had on the enemy and terrain, the time left in the day, and the strength of the Union forces, the Confederates had little to no chance of achieving this feat.
Th e fi rst day of Gettysburg was a classic meeting engagement. Parts of the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia (anv) collided with advance elements of the Union Army of the Potomac (aop) in piecemeal fashion throughout July 1, 1863. By late afternoon the Union forces were badly beaten and retreating from their advance positions. If the Confederates had kept going, the next logical objective for them would have been the key tactical terrain features of Cemetery Hill and Culp's Hill on the south and southeast side of the town. Instead, they pulled up short, consolidated their gains, and waited for With the two opposing armies in motion looking for each other, fi rst contact occurred just outside the town of Gettysburg on June 30 when Henry Heth's Confederate division of A. P. Hill's Th ird Corps spotted elements of John Buford's Union cavalry division. Th e next day, July 1, Heth's division proceeded at a deliberate pace toward Gettysburg to deal with the Union horsemen. Instead of just cavalry, Heth ran into the lead elements of the aop. Both sides fed forces into the battle throughout the day as they arrived. By late aft ernoon, the battle had reached its most critical point. Jubal Early's division of Richard Ewell's Second Corps had successfully gained the right fl ank of the Union Eleventh Corps forces and caused them to retreat through the town of Gettysburg to Cemetery Hill with the Confederates following close behind. In the ensuing fi ght within the town, confusion reigned and the Confederates took prisoner many thousands of Union soldiers. At the same time, the Union First Corps holding the Seminary Ridge line gave way. Th e weight of Ewell's other division under Robert Rodes with Hill's added reinforcements of Dorsey Pender's and Heth's divisions forced the Union First Corps to conduct a contested retreat joining the remnants of the Eleventh Corps on Cemetery Hill (see map 1).
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Th e Confederates had achieved a resounding tactical victory for the day and turned their attention to consolidating their gains, resupplying their ammunition, tending to casualties, and processing prisoners. Th ey awaited the arrival of the rest of the army and prepared themselves for what the next day would bring. At the time, this seemed the best and most prudent course of action. Th e need to continue the fi ght and press on to Cemetery Hill was not a concern. Once again, the anv had bested their aop adversary and there was no reason to believe the next day would not see similar achievements.
It was aft er the battle was over and the full extent of the defeat was realized that the debate went on as to whether the Confederates could have or should have continued the fi ght on the fi rst day in order to capture Cemetery Hill or Culp's Hill. Th e most critical discussion naturally came from the Confeder-glory, or in Stuart's words, "for some other point at which to direct an eff ective blow, " 2 this action eff ectively took Stuart out of the picture until July 2, late into the Battle of Gettysburg. Th is would become a critical factor in the unfolding events of the fi rst day's battle on July 1.
3
Th e fi rst reliable report of the Union army's location arrived the night of June 28 in the form of a spy. Henry Harrison, employed by Confederate First Corps commander James Longstreet, brought word that the Union army had crossed into Maryland sooner and closer than the Confederates realized. 4 Lee responded quickly. He directed his farfl ung units to immediately concentrate around the Gettysburg and Cashtown area. Gettysburg. Exercising his discretion to engage, he deployed his forces to attack in support of Heth. Seeing Ewell's forces attacking, Hill and Heth convinced Lee (who arrived on the scene) to also join in the attack. 13 By 5:00 p.m. the Union forces were driven from their positions and retreating to Cemetery Hill. 14 Once the Union forces were swept from their forward positions and Gettysburg secured, the corps commanders Ewell and Hill ended the discretionary part of their orders and reverted back to their previous instructions not to bring on a general engagement. Although he exceeded orders upon arriving at the battle, Ewell determined that there was no justifi cation for exceeding the orders now that Gettysburg had been taken. At the same time, Lee, watching the retreat of the Union forces from his position on Seminary Ridge, thought it only necessary to press the enemy to secure Cemetery Hill and sent orders to Ewell "to carry the hill occupied by the enemy, if he found it practicable. "
15 Ewell acknowledged receipt and set about to comply.
16
Aft er the idea of possibly continuing the attack had been cleared by the commanding general, a number of factors had to be taken into consideration to determine the "practicability" of executing such a maneuver. Th ese include the current state of the forces at hand, the known intelligence situation, and the time left in the day.
Th e fi rst factor takes into account what forces were available to make such an assault and their condition. Both corps commanders (Ewell and Hill) made the contention that none of their divisions currently on the fi eld in the late aft ernoon were in any condition to make the eff ort. Ewell stated, "On entering the town, I received a message from the commanding general to attack this hill, if I could do so to advantage. I could not bring artillery to bear on it, and all the troops with me were jaded by twelve hours' marching and fi ghting. " 17 Ewell's division commander Early complained that his command had been doing all the hard marching and fi ghting and was not in condition to make a move. ates themselves. As noted above, Confederate general Trimble strongly advocated that Cemetery Hill was there for the taking, if only the eff ort be made. Confederate division commander Early urged an immediate advance "before the enemy should recover from his evident dismay. "
7 Arriving on the scene late, the aides-de-camp for Confederate division commander Edward Johnson, seeing apparent inaction on the part of Ewell, would lament, "Oh, for the presence and inspiration of Old Jack for just one hour!" 8 Meade himself believed that had the Confederates immediately advanced and occupied Culp's Hill, given the condition and numbers the Union had to oppose them at the time, the Union army would have been forced to evacuate the fi eld.
9
Sheer numbers were certainly in the Confederates' favor. By late aft ernoon they had brought into action 25,350 troops and suff ered 4,900 casualties while the Union forces brought in a force of 20,617 troops and suff ered 8,400 casualties. 10 With perfect hindsight and 100 percent intelligence, it is easy to make claims on what should or could have been done. However, any fair examination must be made from the context of what was known at the time.
Th e fi rst part of investigating whether the Confederates could have taken Cemetery Hill or Culp's Hill is to understand the situation in the late afternoon of the fi rst day. Confederate commanders were under discretionary orders to handle enemy forces if encountered but with a fi rm understanding not to bring on a general engagement.
11 Heth did his level best to adhere to the intent of these orders when he fi rst approached the town of Gettysburg. Aft er sending in only half his division and receiving a severe drubbing by the lead elements of the Union army, he pulled back and awaited further developments. Ewell, on the other hand, aft er learning of Heth's encounter, immediately changed his direction of march and headed for Gettysburg.
Th e number of hours for each brigade that entered the battle on July 1 was calculated from the time it broke bivouac to the time it stopped fi ghting that day, not counting any sort of downtime.
22 Th e marching and fi ghting hours were combined and assigned a standard stoplight code to illustrate the state of exhaustion a unit would incur having exerted this eff ort. Using the modern U.S. military example as a base, the color codes were assigned as follows:
Th e next area measured is the eff ect of casualties sustained. Th e U.S. military considers a unit neutralized (unit temporarily out of action) if it sustained 10 percent casualties, and destroyed (unit permanently out of action) if it sustained 30 percent casualties.
23 While these measures may not directly translate to Civil War experiences, it does provide a reasonable starting point to assess units. Using these modern U.S. military percentages as a base, a standard stoplight color code was again assigned to illustrate the state of casualties incurred by each brigade:
Combing these together, table 1 shows that by the late aft ernoon of day 1, every Confederate brigade was in a red exhaustive state, and the only brigades that sustained fewer than 10 percent casualties were three of Early's brigades and one of Pender's. Taking the two assessment areas in combination, a fi nal assessment can be presumed for each of the Confederate brigades. Th e results show that, of the units Hill believed the enemy had been defeated and was content with their gains: "Under the impression that the enemy were entirely routed, my own two divisions exhausted by some six hours' hard fi ghting, prudence led me to be content with what had been gained, and not push forward troops exhausted and necessarily disordered, probably to encounter fresh troops of the enemy. "
19 Th e condition these commanders were referring to was the state of disorganization and exhaustion their troops were in aft er marching and fi ghting since early morning. An analysis of their forces shows they, in fact, were speaking accurately. Th is analysis looks at two areas to assess the fi ghting condition of each Confederate brigade at the end of the fi rst day. Th ese two areas are the hours each brigade spent marching and fi ghting and the casualties they sustained.
Th e problem with associating a condition level to a unit based on a number of hours spent marching and fi ghting is that there is no real scale of measure that says x hours of activity equals x level of exhaustion. However, a reasonable comparison can be drawn from the experiences of participants in a former modern-day U.S. military training event. In the Marine Corps, an infantry battalion used to be required to hump (road march) with full kit a distance of twenty-fi ve miles. Th is eff ort took seven to eight hours to complete, at the end of which the unit was extremely played out with generally little energy left to conduct activities of any major exertion.
20
Th is example can be used to help gauge the condition of Confederate forces by looking at the number of hours each brigade spent marching and fi ghting. Marching and fi ghting are two very diff erent activities, but participation in direct combat, while not necessarily the same exertion of physical energy as a road march, does have a similar exhausting effect as marching when mental stress and anxiety are factored. 21 In this way, marching hours and fi ghting hours can be equated on a one for one basis and, when combined together, give an idea of the state of condition of a particular force. Th is lack of intelligence was mainly the result of Stuart's ride around the Union army, which took him away from his primary duties. Union cavalry had vastly improved in the years leading up to Gettysburg and had dogged Stuart throughout his ride.
25 Th eir aggressive pursuit denied Stuart visibility on the main Union force and kept him out of the picture until late on the second day. At the same time, Union cavalry at Gettysburg under Buford had good intelligence on the Confederates and masked the movement of Union forces approaching the battlefi eld. By their screening actions, the Union cavalry prevented the Confederates from gaining knowledge on the exact nature of the aop forces and terrain they were facing.
By late aft ernoon on July 1, other than what they could directly observe, the Confederates were still largely ignorant of what they faced, both in terms of enemy and terrain, south and west of Cemetery Hill (see map 2), driving further doubt into the minds of Confederate commanders on whether they should or could attack. Hill would note, "Th e want of cavalry had been and was seriously felt. " 26 Buford's cavalry division, screening the approaches southwest of Cemetery Hill, presented a strong deterrent for reconnaissance or maneuver in that area. 27 West of Gettysburg, the lack of enemy intelligence would bleed off Confederate forces needed elsewhere. As Ewell was discussing the situation with his commanders shortly aft er they entered the town, a report came of possible Union forces approaching on the Confederate extreme left fl ank. Although the report seemed doubtful, two brigades were diverted to counter this perceived threat, essentially taking them out of supporting distance for any follow-on attack.
28 Th e nature of the known terrain also infl uences the selection of any sort of possible attack position and avenue of approach to the enemy. Th e town of Gettysburg was the greatest obstacle to tactical immediately available, only the brigades of Avery, Hays, Smith, and Th omas, amounting to around 4,500 troops, were anywhere near in shape to carry on an attack.
Had the Confederates designated an attack force, presumably from these four brigades, positions from which to launch the attack would have to be found. Ideally, these positions would be close by and have relatively decent protection from the fi re of Union artillery gathering on Cemetery Hill. Th e selection of these positions would be infl uenced by the second factor-intelligence, or what was known of the enemy and the suitability of the terrain.
As mentioned earlier, in the Civil War, primary responsibility for providing intelligence on enemy locations fell to the cavalry. In addition to locating and tracking enemy forces, they also performed the duties of screening their forces from the intelligence gathering activities of the enemy. Leading up to the battle and throughout day 1, none of the Confederate commanders had any idea of the whereabouts of the Union army. 24 All day long, the Confederates Factoring the conditions of enemy intelligence and terrain leaves three potential positions for launching an attack. Th e fi rst two are either Seminary Ridge or an area directly west of Gettysburg (positions X and Y on map 2). Th e approach from these positions has the town on the left and an open fi eld on the right fl ank and strikes the west side of Cemetery Hill. Th e third is just east of the town and turns west in front of Culp's Hill to strike the east side of Cemetery Hill (positions Z and Z1 30 ). Selecting positions any farther from these runs up against unknown terrain and enemy and would cause additional delay to the start time of an attack. Th is leads to our third factor: time.
Night was fast approaching. Th e sun would set until he thoroughly understood it) took time. A simple exchange of two or three messages could take an hour. At the same time, units would have to reorganize, including disengaging from their current activities of resupply, prisoner processing, recovery of the wounded, and disentangling themselves from places like the town itself. Th ey would then have to deploy to a suitable attack position and fi nally make the move over the actual approach route. Along with the message traffi c described above, these preattack activities could take two or more hours to complete. A theoretical best-case time line for this might look as illustrated in fi gure 1.
Other Confederate forces were coming late on the scene; but again, time would be their biggest detriment. Ewell, aft er determining Cemetery Hill was unassailable, sent off two of his aides-de-camp to scout Culp's Hill. Th e two reported the hill unoccupied, and Ewell decided to occupy Culp's hill with his third division under Edward Johnson just arriving onto the battlefi eld. However, running into traffi c from other units, Johnson's division only reached Gettysburg around 7:00 p.m. and was unable to make a move onto Culp's Hill until well past dark. Th e division of Richard Anderson of Hill's Th ird Corps had also just come up but was immediately placed in reserve owing to the uncertainty of the situation and late hour of the day. 34 By that time, Union forces were at hand. 35 34 Trudeau, Gettysburg, 247. 35 Donald Pfanz, Richard S. Ewell, Trudeau, Gettysburg, at 7:41 p.m., and darkness (End of Evening Nautical Twilight, or eent) would come at 8:55 p.m.
31 Night fi ghting in the Civil War was diffi cult and hazardous at best. Command and control of maneuvering forces was conducted primarily by line of sight. With reduced visibility, commanders had a hard time seeing their units and ran a high risk of mistaking friend for foe.
To make an attack, the Confederates would fi rst have to conduct a leader's reconnaissance and issue new orders to subordinates. Lee did send new orders to attack Cemetery Hill if practicable, and Ewell promptly acted by conducting a quick reconnaissance.
32 He determined he could make an attack if Hill supported him from the west, so he sent off a messenger to Lee to request this support. Lee sent back that there would be no support from Hill and urged Ewell to attack with the Second Corps alone.
33
At this point, Ewell decided an attack on Cemetery Hill could not be carried off .
Th is back-and-forth between Lee and Ewell illustrates the time it takes just to initiate an attack. Th e primary mode of communication was by horseborne courier. Lee, in his position on Seminary Ridge, and Ewell, in the town of Gettysburg, were almost a mile apart. Traveling the distance back and forth, locating the principle recipient, and composing each message (or verbalizing it to the courier 31 Sunset and eent obtained from Astronomical Applications Department, U.S.
Naval Observatory, Washington, dc, http://aa.usno.navy.mil/data/index.php, last updated January 29, 2015 , accessed September 1, 2014 Trudeau, Gettysburg, 251-56. tack, particularly those coming from the approaches illustrated in map 2. Additionally, the longer the Confederates took to get their forces in motion, the longer the Union forces had to recover from their day's exertion, gradually mitigating the impact of hours spent marching and fi ghting.
While these units consolidated and recovered, other Union reinforcements were rapidly closing on the battlefi eld. Aft er some initial confusion, Henry Slocum's Twelft h Corps with two divisions approached the battlefi eld from the Baltimore Pike, which led into Gettysburg from the southeast. One division, under Alpheus Williams, with 3,415 men had actually made it to Benner's Hill and was about to attack it, when it was called back to the Baltimore Pike around 5:30 or 6:00 p.m. (this force was undetected by the Confederates and was not the cause of the diversion of Ewell's two brigades mentioned Hill. Th e better parts of nine batteries were resupplied, set up, and covering the approaches to the hill from the east, west, and from the town. Th e batteries had been in the fi ght throughout the day and had lost eight guns out of fi ft y-four, mainly from capture. 41 Th ose that remained were well manned and expertly sighted by their commanders. 42 Map 3 graphically illustrates the area covered by these guns if the Confederates had continued the attack. Th e darker shades represent a greater number and heavier caliber of guns able to fi re into those areas, and the ranges equate to the distances the type of gun could reach owing to its design and the terrain. 43 es immediately available to the Confederates, only four brigades with 4,500 men were anywhere near in shape to make an attack. Second, because of inadequate cavalry support, they had no intelligence on what they would face in terms of both enemy and terrain, other than what they could directly see. Th ird, they had less than three hours before sunset and less than four hours before darkness to decide, reorganize, deploy, and conduct an attack. Last, the Union had nine thousand to twelve thousand goodcondition forces available to seriously contest any attempt made.
Perhaps the greatest factor against the Confederates taking action at the end of the fi rst day was their attitude and overconfi dence. Th ey left it to the next day to beat their enemy once again. Confederate general E. P. Alexander later wrote, "Like the rest of the army generally, nothing gave me much concern so long as I knew that Gen. Lee was in command. I am sure there can never have been an army with more supreme confi dence in its commander than that army had in Gen. Lee. We looked forward to victory under him as confi dently as to successive sunrises. " 47 James Arthur Fremantle, a British offi cer attached to the Confederates during the battle, captured it best. While sitting with a number of Confederate offi cers aft er the fi rst day, he recorded, "Th e staff offi cers spoke of the battle as a certainty, and the universal feeling in the army was one of profound contempt for an enemy they have beaten so constantly, and under so many disadvantages. " 48 Douglas R. Kleinsmith is a retired Marine Corps offi cer whose service includes a combat tour in Desert Storm, a special operations tour in Bosnia, and a Headquarters Marine Corps tour in the Pentagon on 9/11. He currently works as a government consultant and lives in Northern Virginia with his wife of twenty-nine years.
